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INTRODUCTION
This Reply Brief is limited to the issues raised by Appellee
in its Brief of Appellee relative to Appellee's Cross-Appeal.
Those issues are:

(i) whether the district court erroneously

denied Walker's motion for attorney's fees incurred in defending
against Sparks' Motion to Assign Lease and For Declaratory Relief;
and

(ii) whether the district court erred in denying Walker's

request for attorney's fees incurred in bringing its Motion for
Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING WALKER'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDANT AGAINST SPARKS' MOTION
TO ASSIGN LEASE AND FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.
The district court erroneously determined that the Lease un-

derlying the dispute between Walker and Sparks had been terminated,
and that while Sparks' Motion to Assign Lease And For Declaratory
Relief arose out of the Lease, it also arose out of post-judgment
requests for remedies.

Relying on this erroneous determination,

the district court denied Walker's motion for attorney's fees in
successfully defending against Sparks' motion.

Brief of Appellee

at 23.
Sparks maintains, in Appellants' Reply Brief and Brief in
Opposition to Cross-Appeal ("Appellants' Reply Brief"), that the
attorneys fee provision contained within the Lease does not allow
for the recovery for attorney's fees as requested by Walker.
Appellants' Reply Brief at 17-18. This assertion ignores the plain

language of Article 46, as well as the events as they transpired.
Article 46 of the Lease states:
In case of suit shall be brought for recovery of
possession of the leased premises, for the recovery of
rent or any other amount due under the provisions of the
Lease, or because of the breach of any other covenant
herein contained on part of the Lessee to be kept or
performed, and a breach shall be established, the defaulting shall pay to the other all expenses incurred
therefor, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Addendum "B" to Brief of Appellee at 25-26.
Clearly, the Complaint filed by Walker in the Third District
Court seeking Judgment against Sparks for delinquent rent, late
fees, interest, attorney's fees, restitution of the premises, and
future rent (R. 2-45) was a suit "brought for recovery of possession of the leased premises, for the recovery of rent or any other
amount due . . . ."

No one can dispute that Sparks' Motion for

Assignment of the Lease or in the Alternative Motion for Declaratory Judgment was brought as part of the same suit and after Walker
prevailed in its claims for relief.

Sparks' motion was brought

under the same caption, with the same civil number and the same
Judge.
Sparks seems to suggest, in Appellants' Reply Brief, that
since its motion was filed after the Judgment had been rendered,
instead of before, the motion was not a part of the same suit which
had been brought for recovery of possession and rent.
stated:

Sparks

"Unlike the situations contemplated and listed in Article

46, Sparks' post-judgment motions did not request a finding that
one party was 'defaulting' or recovery from a defaulting party."
2

Appellants' Reply Brief at 18.

This statement is misleading for

two reasons.
First, while Sparks' motion itself did not request a finding
of default, Sparks had already been deemed the defaulting party for
purposes of this suit. As the prevailing party, Walker is entitled
to attorney's fees in pursuing claims and in defending against the
baseless assertions and defenses of Sparks. Second, while Sparks
initially requested an assignment of the substitute lease, its
later ethereal re-characterization of the same motion--to a "motion
to establish a more efficient mechanism for administering remaining
obligations11 --did not change the basic nature of the motion.

It

was and continued to be a motion under which Sparks sought (i) to
gain for itself rights it no longer possessed as a defaulting tenant and (ii) to strip Walker's ability and right to administer and
monitor its own substitute lease; and (iii) to effectively modify
the original judgment obtained by Walker. As such, Sparks' motion
was a motion for recovery under the lease.
In Utah, a party is entitled to an award for attorney's fees
only if provided by statute or by contract. Tholen v. Sandy City,
849 P. 2d 592, 596 (Utah App. 1993) . And, where a contract provides
for the recovery of attorney's fees, it is a mistake of law to
award less than the amount provided for in the contract. Saunders
v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted).
Article 46 of the Lease provided for the recovery of attorneys fees
to the non-defaulting party in a suit brought for the recovery of

3

possession or rents due under the terms of the Lease.
Sparks was found to be the defaulting party.

At trial

After judgment had

been entered against Sparks, Sparks filed its motion seeking relief
under the lease and to modify the previous judgment, which motion
was denied.

It was a mistake of law for the district court to

attempt to limit the scope of Article 46. Accordingly, Walker is
entitled to an award of attorneys fee's in successfully defending
against Sparks post-judgment motion. Saunders, 818 P.2d at 579.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING WALKER'S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN BRINGING ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 8# 1993.
As set forth in the Brief of Appellee, Walker filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment on the 8th of September, 1993 requesting judgment against Sparks in the sum of $921.70 together with interest
and attorney's fees.

Brief of Appellee at 25; R. 834.

Walker's

motion was scheduled for oral argument on the 24th of September,
1993.

At the Sept. 24th hearing, Sparks tendered the $921.70 to

Walker.
bringing

Walker requested an award of attorney's fees incurred in
the motion

district court denied.

for summary

judgment, which

request the

R. 895, 860, 906.

Walker asserts that it is entitled to an award of $300.00 for
attorney's

fees incurred

in bringing

its Motion

for Summary

Judgment for the same reasons it is entitled to an award for
attorney's fees incurred in successfully defending against Sparks'
motion.

Sparks makes much of some of

the district court's

statements regarding its reasons for denying an award attorney's
4

fees relative to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Reply Brief at 19-20.

Appellant's

However, Sparks' selective recall is once

again misleading.
At the hearing, Counsel for Walker indicated that Sparks possessed the same documents that Walker had from which it could verify the delinquent amounts. Sparks had possession of copies of the
Gasperini lease and the Sparks lease from which Sparks could compute

the monthly

deficiencies. R. 900.

Furthermore, Sparks

acknowledged that it received correspondence from Walker's counsel
as well as statements from Walker's property manager setting forth
the amounts due and owing. R. 896. Apparently Sparks believed it
is entitled to more, such as accountings, affidavits from the
property manager, and additional documentation.

R. 896-97.

How-

ever, Sparks has never provided any caselaw or contractual support
for an argument that it is entitled to demand accountings and
affidavits.

Nor did the district court spell out precisely what

type of documents Walker must supply Sparks. The only duty imposed
by the district court was that Walker was to "provide adequate
information to determine a question of arrearage," which Walker
did.

R. 906.
Since Sparks at all times was provided with information suffi-

cient from which to determine its monthly obligation and since
Sparks did not pay such obligation, forcing Walker to bring a
Motion for Summary Judgment, Walker is entitled under the contract
to an award of attorney's fees in bringing such motion.

5

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Walker requests that this Court
overturn the district court's denial of Walker's motions for
attorney's fees incurred in defending against Sparks' Motion to
Assign Lease or in the Alternative Motion for Declaratory Relief
and in bringing its Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this -v^7

day of^September, 1994.
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